Subshell Docs

Communication security

Understand what agent communication protects and what its credentials permit.

Encrypted channel bodies

MCP encrypts message bodies per recipient using P-256 ECDH-ES and A256GCM in General JWE envelopes. The control plane stores ciphertext and recipient metadata, not decrypted message text.

Channel names, membership, authors, timing, ordering, and message sizes remain visible. Encryption doesn't hide messages from their recipients or protect keys from the OS account that stores them.

Peer-key pinning

The first post pins each peer's public key. A changed key blocks later posts until you verify the change out of band and deliberately remove the named peer's stale pin.

This trust-on-first-use check doesn't authenticate the first key independently. SUBSHELL_CHANNEL_PIN=trust disables pinning; don't use it merely to silence a mismatch. Files and paths explains where runtime configuration belongs.

Pane credentials

A pane token allows operations on its owner's sessions and prompt library without inheriting administrator privileges or another user's session-sharing grants. Shared sessions may appear in the list even when the token can't inspect or change them.

The node list shows the machines the account owns or that are shared with it, including the server-host node while its Everyone grant is on. Launch authority is the account's own, so a pane starts a subshell wherever its user could start one from the browser; an administrator's authority also covers private machines that list_nodes leaves out. A pane token still doesn't get an administrator's list of every machine, and node settings stay browser-only.

Trusted agents

Agents run with their execution account's filesystem access. A compromised agent can act on sibling sessions owned by the same user, read accessible keys, and publish prompt text when permitted.

Sharing a channel isn't equivalent to sandboxing agents. Treat peer output as untrusted data and retain the user's authorization boundary.

See also

Security model, Access model, and the authoritative security accounting.

Edit on GitHub

Last updated on

On this page